Friday 25 May 2012

from poster 'sobeit' on iii.co.uk

It is that structure of headcount that makes Blinkx mean and lean.

If you look at the breakdown of the results $91m was AdHoc, $16m was Conventional and $7m was Tech/Services.

Conventional, per se, is really the world in which PVMG and Burst traditionally lived in, so why is it only $16m?

Burst Accounts, 31st December 2010

Total revenues increased to $37.7m - up from $31.4m - and media business revenue increased 21% to $34.7m, including a $2.7m contribution from Burst Media UK which was acquired in April 2010.

PVMG Accounts, 31st December 2010

PVMG's revenues for the year stood at US$29.9 million and profits amounted to US$389,511.

That means the revenues between Burst and PVMG for 2010 was a total of $58m from conventional internet activities and made no profits but according to the Blinkx accounts they only supplied $16m in the last year. That means they have underperformed by about $42m if they have continued doing the same old thing.

However, what they have been doing, according to SC last Friday, is migrating users from conventional (text) advertising to video advertising through AdHoc. As SC said on Friday, there are a number of very big companies who can do their own thing but there are millions of webpages from small users who have not got the facilities to do it. It is this market of moving billions of these pages from either no ads or boring text ads to dynamic video ads with wrap-around text ads using AdHoc and any of the ad formats available through that product and then charging the advertisers for the privilege.

Furthermore, if you do a few simple sums based on SC's figures that they are moving the conventional CPM rates from $0.66 (66cents) to AdHoc's average of $4.65 that is a factor of 7x.

So, in effect if you could move two companies who made $58m in 2010 using conventional means to an AdHoc world with a 7x uplift you end up with those two generating $400m alone. And that is without adding in what Blinkx was doing with AdHoc on its own and its own growth which was obviously significant and must still be progressing.

It does not take a great deal of maths to work out that this market could explode for them and even if it were say rise 3x giving a turnover for the coming year of say $200m in a united company who is going to complain about that?

I know what I would be doing if I was Mike Lynch. I would be coming on board to drive the action. People keep saying that SC is not a real front man but an excellent technician so why not let Mike Lynch be the market facing lead and let the others fall in behind. He is after all a Blinkx non-executive Director but that is because of his position in Autonomy. When that comes to an end where better to go than running Blinkx.

------------

That's the optimistic view of course: and at the moment it sure doesn't seem as though the markets are remotely interested. It very much seems as though Chandratillake has now completely destroyed the trust and confidence of the markets and shareholders: his piss-poor performance on the CC last November, his failure to deliver his own FY target of $124m, the ongoing confusion around exactly what Blinkx's business model is...

The only way forward in my view is a complete clear-out of the current management team and its replacement with a new team who can communicate with shareholders and the markets, can deliver for shareholders, and can build the business and sign the deals to take Blinkx to where it should be...

No comments:

Post a Comment